Beyond-MVG: Origins, Research, Findings, and Recommendations
1. Background & Origins
Section titled “1. Background & Origins”From Minimum Viable Governance to Beyond-MVG
Section titled “From Minimum Viable Governance to Beyond-MVG”Cardano’s decentralized governance framework was introduced through CIP-1694 - A First Step Towards On-Chain Decentralized Governance, first proposed in November 2022 as part of the network’s transition into the Voltaire era.
The proposal established the foundations for on-chain governance through Delegated Representatives (DReps), Stake Pool Operators (SPOs), and a Constitutional Committee (CC). It introduced mechanisms for submitting, voting on, ratifying, and enacting governance actions, enabling ADA holders to participate in decisions concerning the network’s development, protocol parameters, and treasury.
However, CIP-1694 was conceived as an initial governance framework rather than a comprehensive or definitive system. Its stated goal was to introduce a technically achievable first step that could subsequently be adapted and extended through community participation.
The document explicitly acknowledges topics requiring further discussion, including off-chain governance processes and standards, DRep incentives, delegation mechanisms, voting arrangements, and governance action deposits. Several potential improvements are documented under its Other Ideas / Open Questions section.
This approach established an important distinction between implementing the mechanisms necessary for decentralized governance and developing the broader institutional processes needed to support their effective operation.
Constitutional Development and Future Governance Workstreams
Section titled “Constitutional Development and Future Governance Workstreams”The development and ratification of the first Cardano Constitution further reinforced the expectation that governance would continue evolving.
During the constitutional drafting process in 2024, delegates and alternates participated in workshops to develop and refine the Constitution. These discussions also identified matters that required further work beyond the constitutional text itself.
The Governance Action proposing the ratification of the Cardano Constitution explicitly acknowledged that the Constitution could require future revisions and identified several Future Governance Workstreams.
These workstreams concerned:
- Governance processes and procedures better addressed outside the Constitution.
- Processes necessary to implement specific constitutional provisions.
- Potential constitutional amendments informed by experience and feedback from the governance system’s operation.
Additional community workshops were anticipated throughout 2025 to explore these matters.
The constitutional process therefore reinforced a principle already present in CIP-1694: establishing a decentralized governance framework was an important milestone, but its continued development would require experience, evaluation, and community involvement.
The Need for Systematic Governance Assessment
Section titled “The Need for Systematic Governance Assessment”With Cardano’s on-chain governance mechanisms becoming operational, a further challenge emerged: how to determine whether the system was functioning effectively and identify areas requiring improvement.
Governance actions, voting records, and participation statistics provide observable information about the system. However, these alone do not necessarily explain the motivations, barriers, or institutional challenges affecting governance participants.
In 2025, the Input Output (IO) Voltaire team and community collaborators proposed Beyond Minimum Viable Governance (Beyond-MVG) as an initiative to address this need.
The project sought to establish a structured process for evaluating Cardano’s governance, combining quantitative on-chain measurements with qualitative information gathered from community participants.
Its purpose was to identify governance challenges through evidence, establish measurable indicators, and inform possible improvements through community discussion and research.
Although consistent with the evolutionary approach described in CIP-1694 and the constitutional process, Beyond-MVG was a separate initiative developed subsequently, rather than a project explicitly mandated by those documents.
2. Proposal & Treasury Funding
Section titled “2. Proposal & Treasury Funding”Original Proposal
Section titled “Original Proposal”Beyond-MVG was submitted to the 2025 Cardano Budget Process, coordinated by Intersect, under the title:
Beyond Minimum Viable Governance: Iteratively Improving on Cardano Voltaire
The proposal was developed by Input Output’s Voltaire team, with contributions from governance researchers, constitutional delegates, and community participants.
Its central motivation was the absence of an established, transparent, and data-driven process for systematically evaluating Cardano’s governance performance.
The proposal warned that, without reliable measurements and structured feedback, governance discussions could become fragmented and reactive, limiting the community’s ability to identify emerging risks and prioritize improvements.
To address this problem, Beyond-MVG proposed a repeatable process combining governance measurement, community consultation, analysis, and recommendations.
The proposed work included:
- Governance Measurement Framework: Identify and benchmark indicators for evaluating governance participation, effectiveness, and overall health.
- Data Collection: Gather quantitative information from on-chain sources and qualitative evidence through surveys, interviews, and community workshops.
- State of Governance Report: Produce a structured assessment identifying relevant patterns, challenges, and opportunities for improvement.
- Recommendations and Proposals: Develop recommendations and, where appropriate, initial Cardano Problem Statements (CPSs) or Cardano Improvement Proposals (CIPs).
- Governance Assessment Playbook: Document the methodology and lessons learned so that future assessments could reproduce and refine the process.
The proposal also contemplated the possibility of repeating the assessment periodically, subject to community interest and additional funding.
Its scope focused on identifying, documenting, and developing potential governance improvements. Further funding could be necessary to advance proposals into implementation.
Inclusion in the 2025 Cardano Budget
Section titled “Inclusion in the 2025 Cardano Budget”The project participated in the broader community budget process facilitated by Intersect in 2025.
Between April 1 and May 5, 2025, this process received 194 funding submissions covering different areas of the Cardano ecosystem.
Proposals underwent community review and off-chain preference signaling, including a final vote conducted through the Ekklesia platform.
Proposals receiving support from more than 50% of the participating DRep voting stake could advance into Intersect’s consolidated budget, provided they had selected Intersect as their administrator.
Beyond-MVG was among the 39 initiatives included in the resulting Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget Info Action.
The consolidated budget totaled ₳275,269,340, covering development, maintenance, governance, infrastructure, and other ecosystem activities.
This budget-level approval did not itself transfer funds from the Cardano Treasury. Individual projects still required separate Treasury Withdrawal governance actions and were subject to the applicable constitutional requirements, budget limits, and administrative arrangements.
Treasury Withdrawal and On-Chain Approval
Section titled “Treasury Withdrawal and On-Chain Approval”In July 2025, Intersect submitted a Treasury Withdrawal governance action on behalf of the Beyond-MVG project.
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Governance Action | Withdraw ₳592,780 for Beyond Minimum Viable Governance: Iteratively Improving on Cardano Voltaire |
| Type | Treasury Withdrawal |
| Requested Amount | ₳592,780 |
| Submitted By | Intersect, on behalf of the project |
| Project Leadership | Input Output - Voltaire Team |
| Submission | July 2025 |
| Enactment | August 22, 2025 - Epoch 578 |
| Outcome | Enacted |
The action received the required approval from DReps and the Constitutional Committee, including seven affirmative votes from the Committee. SPO approval was not required for this type of governance action.
Its enactment authorized the Treasury Withdrawal for the project, establishing an on-chain record of the funding decision.
The governance action can be independently examined through the following explorers:
On-chain Governance Action References
- Governance Action ID (Bech32):
gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlpvhtd5td - Governance Action ID (Legacy):
8ad3d454f3496a35cb0d07b0fd32f687f66338b7d60e787fc0a22939e5d8833e#22 - Metadata Anchor (IPFS):
ipfs://bafkreigltrp3abb6s667vrtnyspriii2j4wg25cieulbn26s3v36d4qsay - Metadata Anchor Hash:
0fea1e7935a6a4257cf894d12c10ce650bf760b1bfa5cd13f51de6f7cdde9f6a
For information on the project’s treasury fund disbursements, refer to the Sundae Treasury Contracts Dashboard.
Original Proposal and Supporting Documentation
Section titled “Original Proposal and Supporting Documentation”The Treasury Withdrawal metadata preserves the original project’s abstract, motivation, rationale, vendor profile, and funding administration arrangements.
It also references supporting materials documenting the project’s conceptual origins and the budget approval process.
The principal historical references are:
- CIP-1694 - A First Step Towards On-Chain Decentralized Governance
- Cardano Constitution Ratification - Governance Action
- Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 2025
- Beyond-MVG - Treasury Withdrawal
- Original Beyond-MVG Budget Proposal - Ekklesia
Together, these records establish the institutional context, stated objectives, approval process, and funding arrangements under which Beyond-MVG was undertaken.
3. Research Scope & Methodology
Section titled “3. Research Scope & Methodology”Research Objectives and Assessment Framework
Section titled “Research Objectives and Assessment Framework”Beyond-MVG was designed to assess the operation and health of Cardano’s decentralized governance system through a combination of measurable indicators and community-based research.
Rather than evaluating individual governance decisions or ranking specific participants, the project examined broader patterns of participation, decentralization, accountability, and institutional effectiveness.
Its central research instrument was the Governance Measurement Framework (GMF), developed to provide a consistent basis for assessing governance performance over time.
The framework drew upon three complementary sources of knowledge:
- Cardano Governance Documentation: CIP-1694, the Cardano Constitution, and the governance mechanisms established through the Voltaire era.
- Traditional Governance Research: Principles of participation, transparency, accountability, and democratic legitimacy, including references to standards developed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
- Decentralized Governance Research: Empirical studies of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), stakeholder participation, voting power distribution, and governance incentives.
These references informed a framework consisting of 12 governance metrics organized around four principal stakeholder groups.
The Twelve Governance Metrics
Section titled “The Twelve Governance Metrics”| Stakeholder Group | Assessment Area | Governance Metrics |
|---|---|---|
| ADA Owners | Legitimacy & Participation | 1. Active voting ADA percentage; 2. Unique stake addresses delegated to DReps; 3. DRep delegation stickiness |
| Delegated Representatives (DReps) | Decentralization & Accountability | 4. Gini coefficient of voting power; 5. Nakamoto coefficient; 6. Voting rationale publication rate; 7. Net change in active DRep count |
| Stake Pool Operators (SPOs) | Security & Oversight | 8. Governance Action engagement; 9. SPO delegation stickiness |
| Constitutional Committee (CC) | Constitutional Adherence & Oversight | 10. Governance Action response time; 11. Voting rationale publication rate; 12. Abstention rate |
The metrics were intended to capture different dimensions of governance behavior.
For example, the Gini and Nakamoto coefficients measure aspects of voting power concentration, while delegation stickiness examines how frequently stakeholders reconsider their delegation choices. Rationale publication rates provide an observable indicator of transparency, although publication alone does not establish the quality of a justification.
Taken together, these indicators provide a more comprehensive picture than participation statistics considered in isolation.
The complete definitions, calculation methods, and data requirements are documented in the project’s Governance Measurement Framework and Governance Metrics Manual.
Quantitative Research: On-Chain Governance Data
Section titled “Quantitative Research: On-Chain Governance Data”The quantitative component examined governance activity across epochs 537–609, covering January 29, 2025, through January 24, 2026.
This period captured Cardano’s first year of fully operational on-chain governance following the Plomin hard fork.
Measurements were derived from blockchain records using Cardano Node, cardano-db-sync, and standardized SQL queries.
The analysis examined observable governance behavior, including:
- ADA delegation and voting participation.
- Changes in DRep voting power distribution.
- DRep registration, activity, and rationale publication.
- SPO voting participation and delegation patterns.
- Constitutional Committee participation, response times, and abstention.
Measurements were organized using epoch-boundary snapshots to support consistent comparisons over time.
The project also published underlying datasets and visualizations, allowing researchers and tooling providers to examine the measurements independently.
The quantitative records are available in the official repository:
Qualitative Research: Community Experiences and Perceptions
Section titled “Qualitative Research: Community Experiences and Perceptions”Quantitative measurements reveal observable patterns, but do not necessarily explain why stakeholders behave in particular ways.
To complement the on-chain analysis, Beyond-MVG gathered qualitative information through community surveys, semi-structured interviews, workshops, and public feedback.
Participants represented several governance-related groups, including ADA holders, DReps, SPOs, Constitutional Committee members, and ecosystem builders.
According to the final report, the qualitative assessment incorporated 87 responses, including 69 unique respondents identified by primary governance role and additional responses from participants occupying multiple roles.
The research explored subjects such as:
- Motivations for participating in governance.
- Difficulties understanding and evaluating Governance Actions.
- Experiences with delegation, voting, and governance tools.
- Perceptions of voting power concentration.
- Financial and operational barriers to sustained participation.
- Suggestions for improving governance processes and accessibility.
Community workshops provided an additional opportunity to discuss observed problems, compare perspectives, and develop potential solutions.
During the project’s final stage, further workshops focused specifically on identifying and prioritizing actionable recommendations.
Publicly available survey materials, workshop summaries, and supporting visualizations are organized in the Beyond-MVG Qualitative Research Archive.
Community Prioritization Platform
Section titled “Community Prioritization Platform”During the recommendations phase, Beyond-MVG workshops also incorporated a dedicated web application developed by project contributor Tevo Kask to support participatory identification and prioritization of governance challenges.
The Beyond-MVG Community Prioritization Platform allowed participants to contribute ideas and record their assessments of the relative priority of governance problems and potential improvements.
The platform supported structured prioritization through MoSCoW classifications and multidimensional numerical scoring, recording participant assessments alongside workshop discussions, surveys, and interviews.
This approach enabled participants to contribute directly to the prioritization process, complementing the project’s quantitative measurements and qualitative research.
For a detailed examination of the platform’s workflow, prioritization methods, participation data, and the relationship between its consolidated proposals and the final report’s recommendations, see the Agora Knowledge Base article Beyond-MVG - Community Prioritization: Methods, Data, and Findings.
Research Limitations and Interpretation
Section titled “Research Limitations and Interpretation”The assessment provides an evidence-based account of an early period in Cardano’s governance development, but its findings are subject to several limitations.
Observation Period: The quantitative findings describe governance activity during epochs 537-609. They should not automatically be treated as representative of subsequent periods.
Participant Representativeness: The qualitative research primarily reflects individuals already engaged with governance. Its findings cannot be generalized to all ADA holders or to individuals who did not participate.
Behavioral Interpretation: Observable actions can have different explanations. For example, stable delegation may indicate satisfaction, inattention, or difficulty changing representatives. Similarly, a published voting rationale does not necessarily demonstrate substantive accountability.
Measurement Boundaries: The calculations depend on defined observation periods, voting classifications, and epoch snapshots. Governance Actions still undergoing voting at the end of the observation period require particular care when interpreting participation.
Comparative Benchmarks: Comparisons with traditional elections, shareholder voting, and other DAOs provide context, but differences in voting systems, incentives, and stakeholder structures limit their direct equivalence.
Consequently, the results are most appropriately understood as an initial governance assessment and baseline for continued observation, rather than a definitive evaluation of Cardano’s long-term governance performance.
4. Findings & Governance Challenges
Section titled “4. Findings & Governance Challenges”Overview of the State of Governance Report
Section titled “Overview of the State of Governance Report”The principal analytical outcome of Beyond-MVG was the State of Cardano Governance Report, published in June 2026.
The report combined quantitative measurements with community research to evaluate how Cardano’s governance framework had operated during its first year.
Its overall conclusion was that Cardano’s on-chain governance mechanisms were operational and had achieved significant initial participation, while several structural and institutional challenges remained unresolved.
The analysis identified progress in stakeholder onboarding, governance transparency, and the execution of Governance Actions.
At the same time, it highlighted concerns involving voting power concentration, passive delegation, participation barriers, fragmented tooling, and the sustainability of governance roles.
The findings were organized primarily around the four stakeholder groups defined in the Governance Measurement Framework.
ADA Holders: Participation Growth and Delegation Stickiness
Section titled “ADA Holders: Participation Growth and Delegation Stickiness”The research found that governance delegation expanded substantially during the observation period.
The proportion of circulating ADA delegated for governance increased from approximately 15% to 40%, while the number of unique stake addresses delegating to DReps grew from roughly 30,000 to 95,000.
However, the report distinguished between delegated voting power and active participation.
Approximately 16% of circulating ADA was associated with active voting, excluding the Always Abstain option. The broader figure approached 39% when Always Abstain was included.
Delegation behavior also remained relatively static.
The study reported redelegation rates below 0.1% per epoch, indicating that comparatively little voting power moved between representatives over time.
These findings raised questions about whether Cardano’s liquid democracy mechanisms were functioning as dynamically as intended.
Although ADA holders can change their governance delegation, the availability of that mechanism does not necessarily mean that participants regularly evaluate or reconsider their choices.
The report therefore identified delegation stickiness as an important challenge for accountability and the responsiveness of representative governance.
DReps: Voting Power Concentration and Sustainability
Section titled “DReps: Voting Power Concentration and Sustainability”One of the project’s most significant findings concerned the distribution of governance voting power among DReps.
During the measurement period, the Gini coefficient of delegated DRep voting power increased from 0.916 to 0.935, indicating a trend toward greater concentration.
The research also examined the Nakamoto coefficient, estimating that approximately 13–34 DReps were required to accumulate between 51% and 75% of the voting power, depending on the threshold considered.
The report did not characterize this concentration as an immediate governance emergency. Nevertheless, it identified the trend as a potential long-term risk if left unaddressed.
At the same time, the number of active DReps declined from a peak exceeding 600 to approximately 300.
Community feedback suggested that insufficient compensation, participation costs, and difficulties attracting delegations contributed to concerns about the sustainability of the DRep role.
There were also positive developments. The proportion of DRep votes accompanied by published rationales increased over the observation period, suggesting the emergence of stronger transparency practices.
Together, these findings highlighted an important distinction: a governance system may improve its transparency while simultaneously experiencing greater concentration of decision-making power.
SPOs: Declining Governance Participation and Operational Barriers
Section titled “SPOs: Declining Governance Participation and Operational Barriers”The assessment identified a decline in active SPO governance participation, from approximately 55% to 37% during the observation period.
This occurred despite the continued importance of SPOs in securing Cardano’s network through stake pool operations.
The research found that SPOs tended to prioritize Governance Actions where their participation was required, particularly decisions related to protocol security and hard forks.
Qualitative feedback identified important practical barriers.
Among these was the requirement to use stake pool cold keys for governance voting, creating additional operational complexity and security concerns.
SPOs also reported difficulties identifying relevant Governance Actions, accessing appropriate voting tools, and incorporating governance responsibilities into existing operational workflows.
The findings therefore suggested that lower participation could not be interpreted simply as a lack of interest.
Operational friction and inadequate tooling were identified as significant obstacles to sustained SPO governance involvement.
Constitutional Committee: Transparency and Institutional Sustainability
Section titled “Constitutional Committee: Transparency and Institutional Sustainability”The Constitutional Committee demonstrated comparatively strong participation and rationale publication during the assessed period.
The report recorded a 99.8% voting rationale publication rate, alongside full participation in the constitutional amendment proposals examined.
Response times varied according to Governance Action type, with some categories requiring longer periods of consideration.
Despite these positive indicators, the research identified institutional sustainability concerns.
The report noted that one Constitutional Committee consortium had retired due to a lack of compensation and raised questions about the financial, legal, and technical responsibilities associated with Committee participation.
These concerns were particularly relevant for individual Committee members who might lack the organizational resources available to larger institutions.
The findings suggested that high participation and transparency rates did not, by themselves, guarantee the long-term sustainability of the institution.
Cross-Cutting Governance Challenges
Section titled “Cross-Cutting Governance Challenges”Beyond the four stakeholder categories, the qualitative analysis identified five recurring challenges affecting governance participation and effectiveness.
| Challenge | Description |
|---|---|
| Power Concentration | Increasing accumulation of delegated voting power among a comparatively small number of DReps. |
| Tooling Fragmentation | Governance information and participation mechanisms distributed across multiple platforms, increasing the effort required to participate. |
| Incentive Deficit | Insufficient compensation and resources for participants undertaking sustained governance responsibilities. |
| Accessibility Gaps | Technical, informational, and linguistic barriers limiting informed participation. |
| Delegation Stickiness | Limited reassessment and redistribution of delegated voting power despite changes in representation or governance activity. |
These challenges are interconnected.
For example, fragmented tools can make it difficult for ADA holders to compare representatives, reinforcing existing delegation patterns. Likewise, insufficient incentives may discourage smaller DReps from remaining active, potentially contributing to further concentration.
The report emphasized that improving governance required attention not only to protocol rules but also to the tools, incentives, and institutional arrangements shaping actual participation.
The full findings, supporting measurements, comparative references, and analytical limitations are available in the State of Cardano Governance Report.
5. Recommendations & Subsequent Initiatives
Section titled “5. Recommendations & Subsequent Initiatives”From Research Findings to Governance Improvements
Section titled “From Research Findings to Governance Improvements”The final stage of Beyond-MVG focused on translating research findings into practical recommendations.
Community workshops and discussions generated more than 100 ideas addressing the challenges identified during the assessment.
These ideas were evaluated and prioritized according to their potential impact, implementation costs, and practical feasibility.
The final State of Governance Report presented six principal recommendation areas, while the project’s completion announcement highlighted five leading priorities and additional initiatives.
The recommendations were intended to guide further technical development, community coordination, and institutional improvements.
Beyond-MVG’s responsibilities included developing recommendations and initiating practical follow-up actions. Their complete implementation was not part of the project’s original scope.
1. DRep Voting Power Concentration and Incentives
Section titled “1. DRep Voting Power Concentration and Incentives”The report recommended coordinated community discussion on the causes and consequences of DRep voting power concentration.
Potential approaches included changes to delegation mechanisms, voting power limits, and compensation arrangements intended to support sustainable participation.
The recommendations recognized that these mechanisms could interact and produce unintended consequences.
For example, a voting power limit might be circumvented through multiple DRep credentials, while poorly designed compensation could encourage superficial participation rather than substantive governance work.
One documented outcome was the development of CPS-0033 - DRep Voting Power Concentration.
Created by Maureen Wepngong and Danielle Stanko, both contributors to Beyond-MVG, the CPS draws directly upon the project’s research and establishes voting power concentration as a technical problem requiring further investigation.
The CPS does not prescribe a definitive solution. Instead, it documents potential approaches, relevant constraints, and unresolved questions for future technical proposals.
For a detailed examination of DRep voting power concentration, its measurement, and the potential approaches discussed, see the Agora Knowledge Base article CPS-0033 - DRep Voting Power Concentration.
2. Social Governance Incident Readiness
Section titled “2. Social Governance Incident Readiness”The project identified a potential gap in Cardano’s preparedness for governance-related incidents that might not originate from technical failures.
Examples include coordinated manipulation, misinformation, and unexpected situations that could compromise the legitimacy or continuity of governance processes.
The recommendation called for identifying plausible incident scenarios, assessing their severity, and exploring appropriate monitoring, communication, and response procedures.
Unlike protocol-level incident management, these situations may involve questions of institutional responsibility, community coordination, and the boundaries of legitimate intervention.
According to the project’s completion announcement, initial work to explore such scenarios and responses had begun in coordination with Intersect.
However, the available documentation does not establish that a comprehensive governance incident-response framework had been finalized or formally adopted.
3. Wallet Governance Experience and Delegation Requirements
Section titled “3. Wallet Governance Experience and Delegation Requirements”Beyond-MVG recommended improving how ADA holders discover, evaluate, and select DReps through wallet interfaces.
Suggested improvements included more accessible delegation workflows, better representative discovery, and notifications about governance activity.
The research also questioned the protocol requirement linking the withdrawal of staking rewards to an existing governance delegation.
This requirement was originally introduced to encourage participation during the transition to decentralized governance.
However, the project identified concerns that it could encourage users to select default delegation options without meaningfully evaluating representatives.
A relevant technical initiative is CIP-0181 - Remove DRep Requirement for Reward Withdrawals.
Originally proposed by Ryan Wiley in March 2026, the CIP seeks to remove the requirement for governance delegation before withdrawing staking rewards.
Although the proposal was not created by Beyond-MVG, project contributors publicly supported it, contributed research findings to its discussion, and advocated consideration of the change within Cardano’s technical governance process.
The project’s completion announcement also reported engagement with four wallet providers and governance feature improvements underway at least one provider.
These activities constitute documented follow-up efforts, but should not be interpreted as proof that all proposed improvements were subsequently implemented.
For a detailed examination of this proposal, its development, and its implications for ADA holders, see the Agora Knowledge Base article CIP-0181 - Remove DRep Requirement for Reward Withdrawals.
4. SPO Governance Voting Without Cold Keys
Section titled “4. SPO Governance Voting Without Cold Keys”To reduce operational barriers for SPOs, the report recommended enabling governance voting without requiring routine use of stake pool cold keys.
The recommendation pointed to CIP-0175 - Stake Pool Hot Credentials or an equivalent technical solution.
The CIP, originally developed by Ryan Wiley, proposes ledger-level authorization of hot credentials for SPO governance voting.
This approach would allow authorized credentials to sign governance votes while preserving the security role of the stake pool’s cold keys.
The Beyond-MVG team identified the operational barriers to SPO governance participation as a priority and sought to bring relevant technical solutions to the attention of governance institutions and ledger developers.
As part of these efforts, project contributor Ken Erik Ølmheim engaged in discussions involving the Civics Committee and the CIP-0175 development process, helping connect the research findings with ongoing efforts to improve SPO governance participation.
For a detailed explanation of the SPO voting problem, the proposed authorization mechanisms, and their security implications, see the Agora Knowledge Base article CIP-0175 - Stake Pool Hot Credentials.
5. Constitutional Committee Compensation and Tooling
Section titled “5. Constitutional Committee Compensation and Tooling”The report recommended addressing the financial and operational requirements associated with Constitutional Committee participation.
Proposed measures included reimbursement of essential security equipment, access to legal and technical expertise, improved voting tools, and mechanisms for transferring institutional knowledge between successive Committee members.
The project also recognized the need for broader discussion concerning sustainable compensation arrangements.
According to the completion announcement, research into possible reimbursement mechanisms had been concluded, and a proposal was being developed.
The team also identified the possibility of supporting improvements to Constitutional Committee voting tools.
These efforts represented preliminary steps rather than completed institutional reforms.
6. SPO Voting Notifications and Communication
Section titled “6. SPO Voting Notifications and Communication”The project additionally recommended clearer communication concerning Governance Actions that require SPO participation.
SPOs have specific constitutional and protocol-related voting responsibilities, but determining when their participation is necessary can require substantial monitoring and technical knowledge.
Suggested improvements included explicit voting requirement indicators in governance explorers, notifications through SPO tools, and clearer educational guidance.
The objective was to reduce the information burden associated with governance oversight and make time-sensitive participation more practical.
The completion announcement identified this as an additional initiative that had received follow-up attention, without establishing that a comprehensive notification system had been implemented.
Related Research: Cardano Governance Health KPI Report
Section titled “Related Research: Cardano Governance Health KPI Report”A related but institutionally distinct initiative was developed through the Governance Health Working Group (GHWG), operating under the Intersect Civics Committee.
Its Cardano Governance Health - KPI Report, version 1.0 dated December 3, 2025, established a proposed framework of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for monitoring the health of Cardano’s governance system.
The framework organized governance indicators into six categories:
- ADA Holder Participation: Governance engagement, delegation, and voting power distribution.
- DRep Insights & Activity: Participation, voting power concentration, independence, and transparency.
- SPO Governance Participation: Voting activity, participation barriers, and concentration of influence.
- Governance Action & Treasury Health: Governance activity, decision-making processes, and Treasury sustainability.
- Constitutional Committee Activity: Participation, responsiveness, and constitutional oversight.
- Tooling & UX: Accessibility, usability, and transparency of governance interfaces.
For an initial governance health dashboard, the report prioritized seven core KPIs: voting turnout, DRep activity rate, DRep voting power concentration (Gini coefficient), SPO voting turnout, Treasury balance rate, DRep rationale publication rate, and Constitutional Committee turnout.
Although several indicators overlap with Beyond-MVG’s Governance Measurement Framework, the initiatives had different objectives. Beyond-MVG combined twelve governance metrics with qualitative research to assess governance performance over a defined observation period and develop recommendations. The Governance Health Working Group focused on defining a broader framework for continued monitoring, including areas such as Treasury sustainability and governance tooling.
The KPI report primarily establishes measurement definitions and priorities. It does not provide live results or completed technical implementations for every proposed indicator, and further work was envisaged to develop standardized data sources and dashboard integrations.
Despite their shared research interests and some overlapping contributors, the Governance Health Working Group report was a separate research effort, not a deliverable produced under the Beyond-MVG Treasury Withdrawal. Both initiatives nevertheless contributed to the development of more systematic approaches to evaluating Cardano’s governance.
Project Completion and Continuing Responsibility
Section titled “Project Completion and Continuing Responsibility”Beyond-MVG publicly announced its completion on July 1, 2026, following the delivery of its final report, research materials, recommendations, follow-up activities, and governance assessment playbook.
The project’s principal contribution was not the immediate implementation of all proposed improvements, but the development of an evidence-based process for identifying governance challenges and connecting those findings to potential solutions.
Some recommendations resulted in formal technical documents, while others were advanced through discussions with governance institutions, developers, wallet providers, and community contributors.
Their subsequent implementation depends upon additional decision-making, technical development, resources, and participation from the broader Cardano ecosystem.
Consequently, the existence of a recommendation, CPS, or CIP should not be confused with evidence that the corresponding governance problem has been resolved.
6. Documentation & Resources
Section titled “6. Documentation & Resources”Beyond-MVG produced and collected a substantial body of research material, including methodological documents, on-chain datasets, qualitative research, analytical reports, and public progress updates.
The following resources are organized by purpose to support readers who wish to examine the project’s conclusions, understand its methodology, or independently explore the underlying evidence.
Main Research Reports
Section titled “Main Research Reports”State of Cardano Governance Report - June 2026
The project’s principal research report. Presents the Governance Measurement Framework, quantitative findings, qualitative analysis, identified governance challenges, and recommendations.
Beyond-MVG - Project Completion Announcement
The official completion publication, summarizing delivered materials, principal findings, recommendations, and initial follow-up activities.
Cardano Governance Assessment Playbook
A methodological guide documenting the assessment process, intended to help future researchers and community initiatives reproduce or adapt similar governance assessments.
Measurement Framework and Technical Documentation
Section titled “Measurement Framework and Technical Documentation”State of Governance Measurement Framework
Establishes the conceptual foundation for governance assessment, including the stakeholder categories, measurement objectives, and research considerations.
Provides technical definitions and calculation methods for the twelve governance indicators, including the relevant data requirements.
Technical Documentation Directory
Contains supporting research documentation and technical guides, including materials on Cardano Node configuration, data extraction, and visualization procedures.
On-Chain Data and Visualizations
Section titled “On-Chain Data and Visualizations”On-Chain Measurements - Epochs 537–609
The publicly available quantitative datasets used to examine governance behavior across the observation period. The files are organized by ADA holders, DReps, SPOs, and the Constitutional Committee.
On-Chain Visualizations - Epochs 537–609
Charts illustrating the development of governance indicators, including voting power concentration, participation trends, rationale publication, and other metrics.
Community Research and Workshops
Section titled “Community Research and Workshops”Surveys, Interviews & Workshops - Research Archive
Repository of publicly released qualitative research materials, including survey datasets, workshop summaries, visualizations, and documentation describing the sources.
Qualitative Research Data Manifest
Explains the organization of the publicly available qualitative materials, stakeholder groups, file formats, and their relationship to the governance metrics.
Beyond-MVG Project Workshop Template
A reusable workshop structure developed to facilitate governance discussions and support comparable community research activities.
Not all material collected during the project was intended for unrestricted publication. The project specifically identified confidentiality and participant privacy as reasons for withholding certain interview records and transcripts.
Beyond-MVG - Community Prioritization Platform
A participatory web application developed by Tevo Kask to support the identification and prioritization of governance challenges and recommendations during the project’s workshops. The platform provided a structured mechanism for recording community assessments and preferences.
Project History and Milestone Updates
Section titled “Project History and Milestone Updates”The following publications document the project’s development and the transition from measurement design to research, analysis, and recommendations.
- Milestone 2 - Data Release and Progress Update, March 2026
- Milestone 3 - First Draft State of Governance Report, May 2026
- Milestone 4 - Recommendations Development, May 2026
- Project Completion - July 2026
- State of Governance Report - Cardano Forum Discussion
Related Governance Proposals and Independent Research
Section titled “Related Governance Proposals and Independent Research”The following documents provide additional context for problems identified or discussed during the Beyond-MVG research.
CPS-0033 - DRep Voting Power Concentration
A formal problem statement examining concentration of delegated DRep voting power and possible approaches for investigating or mitigating it.
CIP-0175 - Stake Pool Hot Credentials
A technical proposal addressing the use of authorized hot credentials for SPO governance voting.
CIP-0181 - Remove DRep Requirement for Reward Withdrawals
A technical proposal to remove the governance delegation requirement currently associated with staking reward withdrawals.
Cardano Governance Health - KPI Report
An independent governance measurement framework developed by the Governance Health Working Group under the Intersect Civics Committee.
These references document related efforts addressing governance challenges. Their inclusion does not imply that every proposal was created by Beyond-MVG or that the proposed changes have already been implemented.
Central Project Resources
Section titled “Central Project Resources”Together, these materials provide a historical and research-oriented record of Beyond-MVG’s objectives, methodology, findings, recommendations, and initial follow-up activities.
They also establish a documentary foundation for future assessments of Cardano governance, allowing subsequent research to evaluate whether the challenges identified during the network’s first year of fully operational decentralized governance persisted, improved, or evolved over time.

